Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 9 | Issue 2

Article 12

An International Law of Guerrilla Warfare: the
Global Politics of Law-Making, by Keith Suter
Howard S. Levie

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Howard S. Levie, An International Law of Guerrilla Warfare: the Global Politics of Law-Making, by Keith Suter, 9 Md. J. Int'l L. 249
(1985).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol9/iss2/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Journal of
International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

LAW OF CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF GUERRILLA WARFARE: THE
GLOBAL POLITICS OF LAW-MAKING. By Keith Suter. New York,
N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1984, 192 pp., $27.50.
The author of this study states quite candidly that "the book does not
devote as much attention to guerrilla warfare as might be expected from its
title. ... "I While it is true that much of the book is concerned with matters other than the substantive rules of international law applicable in guerrilla warfare, this does not detract from its overall value, but merely from
the validity of its title. This book is an outstanding survey of the political
and practical problems that have beset attempts to upgrade the law of war
between 1949 and 1977. While, as will appear later in this review, the present reviewer does not always agree with the opinions stated or the conclusions reached by the author, this book represents solid scholarship and its
purview goes far beyond the limits which appear to be drawn by the title.
The author lists his three main objectives as being:
a. to examine the attempt to devise rules for guerrilla warfare;
b. to analyze the politics that went into the drafting of the 1977
Additional Protocols; and
c. to give the story behind the Additional Protocols.
He succeeds admirably in attaining all three of these objectives.
Beginning with the anonymous, but authoritative, article in the 1920
British Yearbook of International Law2 and continuing with the unfortunate 1949 decision of the International Law Commission, there is a detailed discussion of the failure of the League of Nations and of the United

1. K. SUTER, AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF GUERRILLA WARFARE 3 (1984). The first four
of the seven chapters include only an occasional passing reference to guerrillas and guerrilla
warfare. Other subjects include "case studies on transnational organizations at work, notably
the United Nations, the ICRC and some human rights international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) .. " id. Fortunately, Michel Veuthey's GUERILLA ET DROIT HUMANITAIRE
(2d ed. 1983), which discusses the substantive rules on the subject, is in the process of being
translated into English. When it is available the two books will supplement each other.
2. The League of Nations and the Laws of War, 1920-1921 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 109. Dr.
Suter identifies that anonymous author as Philip Noel-Baker. K. SUTER, supra note 1, at 3940.
3. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of
the First Session, 1949 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 277, 281 (para. 18).
(249)
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Nations to enter the field of the law of war between 1920 and 1968.' Despite this lack of activity by these international organizations, there were
attempts made to develop the law of war during this period, many unsuccessful, but some successful, to which the author perhaps accords too little
credit. 5 The emphasis which he places on the adoption of the four 1949

Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims" is, of course, fully
warranted. He seems, however, somewhat ambivalent concerning the importance of these instruments. Thus, speaking of Common Article 3 of those
Conventions, the so-called "mini-convention" for non-international wars, he
quotes with approval the statement:
The resulting solution was new, daring and paradoxical; it marks a
decisive step in the evolution of modern law, which tends to restrict
the sovereignty of the state in the interests of the individual.7

and again
. . . it was useful in enabling governments to become accustomed
non-international conflicts being regulated by
to the principle of
8
law.
international
but elsewhere he states that
By grafting the [1977] protocols onto the [1949] conventions, the
drafters have grafted an ambitious text to a near moribund set of
rules.9

4. K. SUTER, supra note 1, at 39-44.
5. Particular reference could be made to the work of the Commission of Jurists which
drafted the 1923 Hague Rules for the Control of Radio in Time of War, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 2
(Supp.1938), and the 1923 Rules of Aerial Warfare, id. at 12; the 1930 London Naval Treaty,
46 Stat. 2858, T.S. No. 830, 112 L.N.T.S. 65; and the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 249 U.N.T.S. 240.
6. Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, 6 U.S.T. 3114/3217/3316/
3516; T.I.A.S. Nos. 3362/3363/3364/3365; 75 U.N.T.S. 31/85/135/287.
7. K. SUTER, supra note 1, at 15, citing J.S. PICTET, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMs 55 (1975).
8. Id. at 17. He does not mention, in this connection, the problem of securing from the
anti-government forces an acceptance of the fact that their acts are likewise "regulated by
international law." In Algeria the anti-French forces demanded its application. M. BEDJAOUI,
LAW AND THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION 207-220 (1961). As a more usual procedure, the antigovernment forces have asserted that they were "not bound by the international treaties to
which others besides itself subscribed.... " 5 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 636 (1965).

9. K. SUTER, supra note I, at 178.
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While there is no question but that numerous provisions of the 1949
Geneva Conventions have been violated in many of the armed conflicts
which have occurred since their adoption and that they have not always
been accorded the respect which they deserve, there has been compliance
with some, and sometimes many, of their provisions in all such conflicts,
and compliance with substantially all of their provisions in some conflicts,
notably the 1982 Falkland Islands War. Even in a conflict such as that
between Iran and Iraq, where there is only minimal compliance, the fact
that both sides have, from time to time, permitted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to function and to visit prisoner-of-war
camps may be attributed to those Conventions. Moreover, many of the
"points of special concern" expressed by both of those countries to the Mission dispatched by the Secretary-General of the United Nations were based
upon the standards of the Conventions.' 0 Under these circumstances they
can scarcely be termed "moribund."
In 1956 the ICRC circulated a set of "Draft Rules for the Limitation
of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War" for
presentation to the XIXth International Red Cross Conference to be held
the following year in New Delhi. Resolution XIII adopted by the Conference directed the ICRC to transmit the Draft Rules to the governments for
their examination."" There they met with a "crushing silence." The author
ascribes this failure to the fact that
.. . the ICRC overlooked one of the main lessons from the recent history of the development of the law of armed conflicts: the development
of such law occurs after an armed conflict, not during one. For it is
immediately following an armed conflict that there is considerable public and official antipathy towards war which can be channelled into
drafting an international law which, being based on the experiences of
that conflict, can try to avoid similar experiences in future conflicts;
lawyers, like soldiers, are always concerned with the last war."
This is a bit of philosophy which both the ICRC and the governments genuinely interested in extending the range of the coverage of the law of war
would do well to bear in mind. This, too, is why diplomats and lawyers are
frequently charged with making law for the last war, rather than for the
next one. Of course, if they were sufficiently clairvoyant to foresee the

10. Prisoners of War in Iran and Iraq: The report of a mission dispatched by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/16962 at 67-71 (1985).
11. Compte rendu de la XIXe Conf6rence Internationale de la Croix-Rouge 170 (1957).
12. K. SUTER supra note 1, at 93.
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weapons and methods of war that would be developed and employed in the
next war, they might do a better job. Unfortunately, they have the normal
8
human limitations!"
Dr. Suter sets the 1968 Teheran United Nations International Conference on Human Rights as the real beginning of the renaissance of governmental interest in updating the law of war. It adopted a resolution on the
subject which, in effect, called on the United Nations to reverse its longstanding policy and enter that neglected field. 4 The General Assembly
thereafter adopted Resolution 2444 (XXIII), "Respect for Human Rights
in Armed Conflicts," 19 December 1968,'15 which, with subsequent similar
annual resolutions, resulted in a series of reports on the subject by the Secretary-General (prepared for him by the Secretariat's Division of Human
Rights)16 . Throughout Chapter 3, titled "Maintaining the Momentum: the
United Nations," the author indicates dissatisfaction with the fact that during the period subsequent to the 1971 Report of the Secretary-General the
United Nations had gradually moved into a passive role with respect to the
task of updating the law of armed conflict, allowing the initiative to pass to
the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Federal Council. He frequently refers to "the opposition of the ICRC towards the UN
involvement in this subject."' 17 He implies that the ICRC was averse to the
idea of the United Nations moving into its "turf." This may well have been
part of the ICRC's motivation-but another part was undoubtedly the fear,
not limited to the ICRC, of the involvement of the UN, a highly political
animal, in an area best left devoid of politics to the maximum extent possi-

13. The author also points out that another reason for the failure of the Draft Rules was
the breadth of such a provision as Article 14 which prohibited "the dissemination of incendiary, chemical, bacteriological, radioactive or other agents .. " He correctly states: "This
was a foolish proposal to make and in retrospect it is difficult to see why the ICRC should have
decided on this course of action." K.SUTER, supra note 1, at 94. (This reviewer's copy of the
Draft Rules contains the following notation made in 1956 beside Article 14: "This is disarmament without effective international control.")
14. For the text of the resolution, see K. SUTER, supra note 2, at 30-31. Dr. Suter ascribes this action to the single-handed efforts of Sean MacBride, then the Secretary-General of
the International Commission of Jurists. There can be little doubt that the author is a great
admirer of MacBride. He devotes eleven pages (24-35) to MacBride's life, his efforts in the
law of war area, and his success in guiding a resolution on the subject through the 1968
Conference; another eleven pages (44-55) on MacBride's efforts to ensure a follow-up by the
United Nations; and frequently refers to him elsewhere. There is, however, a considerable
question as to whether MacBride is actually entitled to all the accolades so showered upon
him.
15. For the text of the resolution, see K. SUTER, supra note 1, at 54.
16. U.N. Doc. A/7720 (1969); U.N. Doc. A/8050 (1970); U.N. Doc. A/8370 (1971);
and U.N. Doc. A/8781 (1972).
17. K. SUTER, supra note 1,at 44, 56.
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ble. The events at the 1974 Geneva Diplomatic Conference clearly demonstrated this. The author himself says:
The Western delegations attended the [1974] session expecting to find
an international law gathering and so tried to discuss the session's business, especially in regard to wars of national liberation, in legal terms.
The other delegations saw it more as a political gathering with legal
considerations taking second place. The 1974 session seemed to consist
of two sets of delegations, which did not fully understand what the
other side was talking about.1 8
and again:
Why, then, should the Third World Governments have risked this collapse [of the 1974 Diplomatic Conference] to incorporate a provision in
Protocol I which the governments at which it was aimed would not
ratify? The explanation to this conundrum could only be found in politics, it did not make legal sense. 19
This reviewer shudders at the possibility of the General Assembly drafting,
or even merely attempting to oversee the drafting, of provisions updating
the law of war. Moreover, the author seems to denigrate the work of the
ICRC. Thus, he says: "In retrospect the [UN's] delay was fatal. It augmented the trend of letting the ICRC handle the work [of updating the law
of war.]"' 20 And again: "The resolution represented success for the lobbying
of the ICRC and Swiss Federal Council, in being able to relegate the UN's
role in this subject to that of monitoring the ICRC's work . ." 1 Although the author states that he is "an admirer of the International Red
Cross" 2 2 and cites another study to support that statement, one certainlydoes not reach that conclusion from this book!
The United Nations having "abandoned" to the ICRC the task of updating the law of armed conflict, the latter convened meetings of Government Experts in 197123 and 1972,24 meetings which resulted in two "Draft
Additional Protocols" to the 1949 Geneva Conventions; and then, at its request, the Swiss Government convened a Diplomatic Conference in Febru-

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

128.
146.
66.
68.
Ch. 4, n.ll, at 126.
109-15.
117-23.
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ary 1974 to consider those drafts. The author's discussion of the trials and
tribulations of this Conference, 25 particularly the political problems of the
first session, would alone accomplish all of his three objectives by giving a
behind-the-scenes view of what transpired at Geneva and, to the extent possible, why.
On a number of occasions Dr. Suter refers to the lack of expertise of
members of national civil services in the field of the law of armed conflict,
particularly in the Third World countries, as having a negative effect on the
actions taken by those nations in this area.2 6 This is, unfortunately,
true-and it is not restricted to Third World countries. This reviewer can
recall commiserating some years ago with an expert from the United Kingdom that in neither his country nor in the United States was there any
substantial number of younger men entering the field. This is, perhaps, understandable with respect to a young practitioner as it is scarcely a field
that will start him on the road to wealth and to security for his family-but
it is not understandable in so far as young political scientists and young
lawyers in the academic world are concerned. The decade of 1970-80 saw
tremendous activity in this area of international law. 2 7 Despite the prognostication of the author, this reviewer believes, as does the senior editor of the
series of which this book is a part, 8 that much additional activity in this
field and in the related field of disarmament can be expected well before the
end of the century, among which might be: a convention banning the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons; an additional
convention (or conventions) on conventional weapons; further prohibitions
on the use of the environment for the purposes of war; further prohibitions
on the use of outer space for the purposes of war; further restrictions on the
use of nuclear weapons; etc. Moreover, what the author says about the lack
of personnel in the Third World countries trained in international law may
no longer be true. Individuals trained in these areas in other countries have
returned to their own countries and have joined their foreign services or
have served as the nucleus for faculties in schools opened there. Books on
various aspects of the subject are flowing from the pens of newly trained
scholars from such countries. Today the President of the International
Court of Justice is from one of those countries.
Finally, a few critical comments which, while they do not really detract from the value of the book, do appear to warrant mention. First, Dr.

25.
26.
27.
(1982).
28.

Id. at Chs. 5, 6, and 7, pp. 128-85.
Id. at 70.
Levie, Some Recent Developments in the Law of War, 25
K. SUTER, supra note 1, at vii.

GERMAN

Y.B.

INT'L

L. 252
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Suter states that "[t]he distinction between international and non-international conflicts is not longer feasible." 9 This reviewer must disagree with
that conclusion. The applicable law has probably moved in this direction as
to "national liberation movements," but there are many conflicts which are
civil wars, pure and simple, to which that statement is not applicable. Salvador, Nicaragua, and a number of other indigenous attempts to overthrow
existing regimes in South America and Africa are obvious examples. This is
why there is an Additional Protocol II dealing with non-international armed
conflicts.
Second, the author's methodology can be said to follow the advice once
given to a speaker: "Tell them what you are going to tell them; then tell
them all that you told them you were going to tell them; and then tell them
what you told them." Each chapter starts with a numbered outline of its
contents; then sets forth the substance; and then presents a numbered summary of what was contained in the chapter. (He also uses a numerical
breakdown for almost every analysis.) While this leaves no doubt with respect to the author's facts, intentions, arguments, and conclusions, the
reader soon acquires a feeling of dbja vu.
Third, throughout the book the author displays what this reviewer understandably considers to be unwarranted and unjustified antipathy towards
"international lawyers." This is climaxed by the following, at the very end
of the book:
If war is too serious to be left to generals, then this book has shown
that the law of armed conflict is too serious to be left to international
lawyers. Disarmament negotiations, by the same token, are too important to be left to the negotiators. NGOs should seek to be involved in
one way or another at all stages of the work. 0
Apart from the fact that many members of the delegations at the Diplomatic Conference were not "international lawyers," it would seem that
treaties on the law of war and on disarmament (which are often the same
thing) are to materialize out of the thin air, drawn therefrom, perhaps, by
Sean MacBride, 31 assisted by non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
many of which have such narrow mandates that they would be interested in
only a single article of a document like the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
Fourth, two minor comments on a personal note: The author states

29. Id. at 149.
30. Id. at 184-85. See also the pejorative reference to "government legal experts and UN
lawyers." Id. at 37.
31. For a discussion of Suter's views about MacBride, see supra note 14.
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that when General Halleck wrote to Francis Lieber on 5 [actually 6] August 1862, requesting his views on the activities of guerrillas, the former
was "then commander of the Union forces in the west during the American
Civil War."32 In fact, Lincoln had appointed Halleck General-in-Chief of
the Union armies on 11 July 1862 and the latter had arrived in Washington
to assume that position on about 23 July. 3 Halleck's letter to Lieber was
'
written from "Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D.C." 34
And, finally, either the author, or his typesetter, or his proofreader, is guilty of one
of the solecisms most disliked by this reviewer-confusing "principle" and
"principal." 3 5
These critical comments detract only to a very slight degree from the
overall value of this book which should unquestionably be on the shelves of
every library that purports to serve as a resource for studies in depth of the
law of armed conflict.
Howard S. Levie*

32. Id. at 1.
33. T.H. WILLIAMS, LINCOLN AND His GENERALS 132-33 (1952).
34. II U.S. DEP'T OF WAR, THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF
CIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES 301 (Ser. III 1902).

THE OFFI-

35. "The UN has six principle organs." K. SUTER, supra note l,at 52.
* J.D., Cornell Law School; LL.M. George Washington University Law School; Colonel,
JAGC, USA (Ret.), 1942-63; Stockton Chair of International Law, U.S. Naval War College,
1971-72, Lowry Professor, 1982; Adjunct Professor of Public International Law, Graduate
Program in International Relations, Salve Regina College, Newport, R.I.; Author of PRISONERS OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT, THE CODE OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT,

(2 vols.).

